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1 Introduction 2
1 Introduction
In the world where modern technology develops at unprecedented rates and mobility levels are greater than
ever before one may begin to assume that ties between countries, whether economic or political, are based
on conscious and rational decisions to cooperate, rather than physical, financial, cultural, historic, or any
other ‘given’ parameters. The idea of the European Union, and especially its expansion to EU27, is largely
based on this assumption: being relatively small in territory, Europe posts big verbal and cultural diversity
and geographic variation, in addition to di erent country-level interpretations of historic past and massive
disparities between purchasing power and living standards, especially between the “old” Europe and EU
newcomers. Still, European integration is believed to be both possible and plausible, and on a number of
levels it seems to work.
Looking at Europe more closely, however, one can spot that European integration often starts on a
sub-regional level, forming regions within regions, systems within systems. Recently, de Prado Yepes (2007)
concluded: “‘New regionalism’ paradigm is a multidimensional form of integration, which includes economic,
political, social, and cultural aspects and thus goes far beyond the goal of creating region-based free trade
regimes or security alliances of earlier regionalisms”. What constitutes a region, what are the factors that
foster regional integration and what it means to participating countries therefore become interesting aspects
of the overall international integration topic.
2 Integration of Baltic Sea region: theory and practice
2.1 Costs and gains of region-building
The dictionary gives the following definition of a region: “Region: a relatively large territory, possessing
physical and human characteristics that make it a unity distinct from neighbouring regions or within a whole
that includes it”. The Baltic Sea region, including Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania, is an interesting mix of political will, pragmatism, and spontaneous economic and cultural
forces. Their integration is largely defined by a geographical unity that derives from a common link: the
Baltic Sea, but member countries also share a common cultural background, political rationality and even a
natural competitive advantage in human communication, merely because of regional linguistic peculiarities.
Although the lingua franca of the region is English, some countries share their own common ‘language’. For
instance, members of the Nordic cooperation speak so-called skandinaviska (common Scandinavian) among
themselves. Linguistic closeness also adds to easier communication between Finns and Estonians, whereas
Russian remains the least complicated international language tool for most Latvians and Lithuanians.
The region has a long history of integration starting with the establishment of the Hanseatic League
(Hanse) in the 13th century. This economic alliance was sustained for the following four hundred years,
based on similarities such as independent city status and respective locations along key trade routes. Intra-
regional progress was interrupted by hostile political forces at the end of the 18th century. For nearly
300 years the Baltic Sea region was split into two rough blocks: the Northwestern, comprised of Sweden,
Denmark, Norway and Finland, which developed following Western European market patterns, and the
Southeastern, consisting of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These three largely remained under Russian
influence: as part of Russian Empire and, from the 20th century onwards, incorporated in the market
planning of the Soviet Union.
The relationship between Northwest and Southeast was resumed for a couple of decades in between the
two World Wars, when the concept of Nordic-Baltic partnership was remembered by young intellectuals.
The idea persisted during the World War II, and the Baltoscandian Confederation by Professor Kazys
Pakötas was published in 1942. To this date it is seen as one of the most original publications regarding
the vision of the Baltic Sea region: although a small-scale, but specific study creating grounds for cultural,
economic and political cooperation between Baltic and Scandinavian nations. Back in the middle of the
20th century, in the whirl of the World War II, the project came as a challenge that an utopian vision of
Northern-European cooperation is possible.
Fifty years later we saw this utopia come true. Soon after the removal of the iron curtain in early 1990s,
Sweden, Denmark and other Northern states were the first to re-create economic and political cooperation
with the post-communist economies and reintegrate them in the market-based economic system. Although
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the EU is often recognised as the main motivation for this integration, it is in fact a false credit. Sweden,
Denmark and Finland all signed free trade agreements with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia long before they
joined the EU, and the level of country-to-country relationship inside the Baltic Sea region remains beyond
their links with other EU nations.
The Baltic Sea region was the first multinational region in the world that which set joint goals and
action plans to implement sustainable development.1 This relatively new idea referred to development that
met the needs of the present without lowering the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. A
central role in the Baltic Sea region was played by the Baltic 21 project, founded as a regional equivalent
to the UN Agenda 21, aiming for sustainable development in the Baltic Sea region by serving as a forum
for cooperation across borders and between stakeholder groups.
The EU itself has recently acknowledged that such ‘new regionalisation’ - as defined by de Prado Yepes
(2007) - may be a logical middle step in creation of the common European market. In 2009, the Baltic
Sea region2 was o cially announced as the EU’s first ‘macro region’, recognising strong economic links and
tradition. European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region reads: “The Baltic Sea Region is a highly
heterogeneous area in economic, environmental and cultural terms, yet the countries concerned share many
common resources and demonstrate considerable interdependence. <...> It is a good example of a macro
region – an area covering a number of administrative regions but with su cient issues in common to justify
a single strategic approach.” The Baltic Sea countries, being a part of the EU, quite clearly form a separate
region on their own, as illustrated by Table 2.1.
In many dimensions the Baltic Sea region already performs better than the EU27 average. It is par-
ticularly strong in public finances, most of education parameters, and demonstrates impressive economic
growth and productivity gains over the last decade. Capital flows from the cash-rich Northwest serve as a
boost for Southeast economies, o ering lucrative returns for investors at the same time. An indirect, but
perhaps an even more desirable e ect is the increased FDI attractiveness of the Baltic Sea region as such.
The sheer market size is one of the strongest determinants of where foreign firms invest, and by harmonising
investment climate and increasing political and macroeconomic stability across the region Baltic Sea coun-
tries can o er prospective investors a larger market, and hence secure greater bargaining power for itself as
a unit. As a result, the entire Baltic Sea region has been way ahead of the EU in terms of real GDP growth
since 2000.
Lower than EU performance is in most cases explainable by the typical market structure and growth
patterns of newly developing countries; in this case nations from what was previously known as the Eastern
Block. The level of GDP per capita is of course lower in the former planned economies of Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania than in Scandinavian countries. Parameters like R&D expenditure and life-long learning
indicators are quite naturally inferior in the Southeastern part of the region if compared to Sweden or
Finland, but even they are improving rapidly. Public spending on education in the Baltic Sea Region –
both Northwest and Southeast – is already considerably higher than the EU average, and so are tertiary
enrolment numbers. The entire region is characterised by strong education culture: in 2010, 75% of all high
school leavers from around the Baltic Sea continued their education in tertiary institutions, compared to
just 61% in the EU.
Compared to EU27, the Baltic Sea region demonstrates much tougher management over public finances
and more responsible crediting practices. Recession that hit Europe in 2008-2009 had a severe economic
impact within the Baltic Sea region, resulting in double-digit GDP declines, mainly because countries in it
refused to foster consumption by getting into more debt. As opposed to most Western European nations
that spent billions of euros on economic stimulus packages and industry bailouts, Baltic and Scandinavian
countries allowed for the consumption to drop. Especially the Southeastern states had a very di cult belt-
tightening year in both public and private sector, but sustainability of fiscal policies was to be maintained
at any cost. Then again, painful austerity measures in 2008-2009 allowed for the region to recover faster
than the rest of the EU in 2010 onwards. In 2011, GDP grew 1.5% in EU27, while the Baltic Sea region
demonstrated a 4% increase.
Even in the aftermath of the 2009 recession, the region’s central government debt is under control and
1 Five Years of Regional Progress towards Sustainable Development, Baltic 21 Series No. 1/200.
2 The newly presented strategy involves eight EU Member States (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Sweden and Germany) and calls for closer cooperation with Russia. The four areas to be targeted as a region include sustainable
development, regional prosperity, accessibility and attractiveness, and safety and security.
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Fig. 2.1: Income dynamics in the EU and the Baltics
bank liquid reserves to assets ratio is considerably higher here if compared to other EU banks. Yes, public
borrowing has been growing in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but it has never come close to numbers
seen in EU27, or even in other individual post-soviet countries like Hungary or Poland. Nor have they
exceeded those recorded in Scandinavian economies, suggesting some sort of intra-regional understanding
of what is sustainable and what is not. But the most interesting aspect here – which is also largely the
point of this paper – is that the Baltic Sea region is growing closer together. Our research suggests that
the key reason behind that is the ‘training ground’ e ect, which is arguably the most e ective form of
integration. The ‘training ground’ concept basically means that well-established Northwestern countries
have been helping their developing Southeastern neighbours enter the global marketplace by sharing their
experience in education, governance and capacity building, in addition to tackling environmental issues,
science and technology, trade and investment and other fields that are regarded as especially conducive for
region-building. The Scandinavian-Baltic relationship does not end there. For the past two decades, general
‘training’ within the Baltic Sea region has been supplemented with country-to-country mentoring, which
suggests the whole new research angle on integration matters.
3 Mentorship in Baltic Sea region: theory and evidence
Quantifyable links between economies manifest through movements of capital, goods and services, and
labour. Together with technological transfer, these are the key ingredients in explaining economic devel-
opment. Abstracting from more structural techniques (see Pesaran et al., 2004, or Pesaran and Smith,
2006), we pursue less ambitious but more flexible approach suitable for transition economies. We ground
our econometric framework on several theories to justify the reduced form system of economic interdepen-
dencies.
Trade can concern factor inputs like capital (FDI) or labour (migration), or goods (pure trade). Thus,
by trading goods, a country implicitly exports labour and capital, Vanek (1968). This interdependence
suggests the necessity to model all major factor movements together, but this is rarely done in practice
(though Bergstrand and Egger (2010) have recently analysed FDI and trade of final and intermediate
goods). The reasons for FDI and trade concern not only the proximity-concentration tradeo . Neary
(2009) rationalises the export platform gain to serve third countries whereas Robb and Vettas (2003) link
countries’ dominanance in trade and FDI through demand uncertainty and irreversibility of FDI. Javorcik
(2004) proves that firms with foreign capital tend to be more productive in Lithuania than firms of entirely
domestic ownership.
To relate FDI with migration, we consider the return of investment in human capital. D’Agosto et al.
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(2006) emphasise complementarity and substitution e ects: higher human capital prevents migration if
wages positively and su ciently reacts to the increased human capital. Generally, domestic population
(and market size) influence FDI flows into transition economies, Neuhaus (2006). We try to combine the
extensive literature on factor movements and macroeconomic dynamics to build a unified model.
3.1 Conceptual Model
Surprisingly little has been done on combining the trade, labour, and investment flows in a systematic way.
We mainly draw from Beine et al. (2001), Galor and Moav (2004) and D’Agosto et al. (2006) to guide our
empirical enquiry. The simplest way to think about dynamics is by introducing two-period lived agents, and
discrete time that runs to infinity. Individuals decide in the first period whether to invest in human capital
and in the second period whether to supply it in the domestic labour market or to migrate. Individuals make
decisions sequentially, firstly making action and later ‘picking fruit’. The argument of bequests, which allows
mimicking behaviour of an economy peopled by infinite-lived individual agents, explicitly acknowledges the
temporal nature of economic integration and maps to empirical exercise.
We will not delve into the details of the infinitely-lived agents in the overlapping generations (OLG)
framework. The interested reader is referred to Blanchard and Fisher (1989, Chapter 3). Just note
that a time series of agents’ decisions require an introduction of gifts and bequests. The consumption
c times price p (expenditure) must equal the budget constraints which include wages wt, investment
in human capital et, gifts gt made by a youngster to the parents in period t, and bequests bt. For-
mally,
q
i
´
Êœ i c1ijt (Ê) pijt (Ê) dÊ = (1≠ ut)wt + bt ≠ gt ≠ eit © y1jt, where yjt is the net income af-
ter paying for parents, investing in education, and receiving the bequest. The expected income in the
second period given the decision in the first period includes the probability to migrate from the region
j, ﬁ1j and the probability (uniform over generations with di erent human capitals) uj,t+1 to loose the
job in the region j in the period t + 1, also the wage abroad wıt , the migration cost ·M , the mea-
sure of ability a1, and the measure of human capital h1jt. The basket of goods in the second period isq
i
´
Êœ i c2ijt (Ê) pijt (Ê) dÊ = Et≠1Wt ≠ (1 + n) bt + (1 + n) gt © y2jt.
One can think that at time t, the first generation consumes the basket of goods c1jt, defined over a
continuum of varieties Êi œ  i, where i denotes the region and includes all traded and domestically produced
brands, or U1jt =
q
i
´
Êœ i c1ijt (Ê)
(◊≠1)/◊ dÊ (that is, propensity to migrate, work or invest are subsumed
to the desire to maximise consumption). The mass of varieties produced in region k is denoted as mk.
Aggregate consumption in the region j is the sum of consumption by the young and the old agents in period
t: Cjt = (1≠ ut)Ltc1jt + (1≠ ut) (1≠ ﬁ1jt)Lt≠1c2jt, where (1≠ ﬁ1jt)Lt≠1 is the remaining labour force
after emigration. We assume that all consumers have identical preferences over a continuum of horizontally
di erentiated product varieties. Thus, consumption level is solely determined by the income, and not by
attributes such as demographic characteristics.
3.1.1 Migration and human capital
Besides investment to education, another agent’s choice is that of migration, closely related to the com-
position of wage. We assume that the wage level is a positive function of the level of human capital. For
extremely small and open countries, labour is mostly a function of foreign demand. The probability of
unemployment3 is equal to ut, and it depends on economic conditions of foreign partners. We assume that
Eut+1 = E (ut + ‘t+1) = ut. We do not analyse unemployment insurance and allow the bequests to act as a
partial insurance.
Then, we have two strands of migrants - those who leave their home for working abroad, and those
who attain education at home and then choose whether to migrate or stay at home. If the first dynasty
of time t decides to invest e1t in education, it will be able to o er a higher human capital level in the
second period: h2,t+1 = h1t
Ë
1 + a1e—1t
È
where h1t is the human capital of dynasty 1 at time t and a1 is a
parameter of ability uniformly distributed among dynasties on the probability space [a, a¯] , and 0 < — < 1.
Then, in the second period, the skilled agent’s wage will grow in proportion of additional human capital:
wt+1 = wt
1
1 + “1h1t
Ë
a1e
—
1t
È2
= wt (1 + “1—ht+1), where “1 is the expected sensitivity of wages to human
3 Though uniform unemployment is assumed, dependence on human capital may be an interesting extension.
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capital as well as a condition of labour market in general, and ·M is the fixed costs of migration. Presence of
fixed costs will generate a threshold level of ability and will partition the ability space, see Supplementary
Material (SM). The present value of the lifetime income is discounted by the discount rate rt, which is
equal to the world interest rate at time t.4 Hence, the present value of lifetime earnings equals NPVt =
(1≠ ut)wt≠e1t + E ((1≠ ut+1)wt+1) / (1 + rt) = (1≠ ut) [wt + E (wt+1) / (1 + rt)] ≠ e1t.5Individuals con-
sider investing in human capital if the benefits outweigh costs, wt+1≠wt > e1t, or wt > e1t/“1h1t
Ë
a1e
—
1t
È
provided “1h1t
Ë
a1e
—
1t
È
> 0. Similarly, the educated migrate if costs are outweighed by the benefits,
wıt+1 ≠ (1≠ ut+1)wt+1 > ·M , or
wıt ≠ wt + (wıt “2 ≠ wt“1)h1t
Ë
a1e
—
1t
È
+ ut+1wt+1 > ·M (3.1)
using wıt+1 = wıt
1
1 + “2h1t
Ë
a1e
—
1t
È2
. Therefore, wage di erentials and lost wages due to unemployment
are important factors of migration decisions, both for unskilled and skilled workers.
3.1.2 Trade
Not only agents, but also firms have decisions to make. Firms can produce domestically, engage in trade or
capital investment. Note that we are dealing with monopolistically competitive firms. Due to a symmetry,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between varieties and firmsmk in region k. Then, the aggregate inverse
demand functions for each variety are generated from the CES preferences:
pijt(Ê) = C≠
1
◊
ijt Yj/
Aÿ
k
mkC
◊≠1
◊
kjt
B
, (3.2)
where Cijt is aggregate demand in region j - variety produced in region i at time t; and Yjt © (1≠ ujt) (1≠ ﬁ1jt)Ljtyjt
stands for the aggregate income which is available for consumption in region j at time t. Note that unem-
ployed and those who left the country do not earn.
Production of c units of output requires tc+F units of inputs, where t is marginal and F is fixed input
requirement. Technology is essentially a function of aggregate labour and capital, all expressed in price of
labour. Shipping varieties both within and across regions is costly. We model trade cost using the ‘iceberg’
argument, well-known in economic geography when shipping one unit of any variety requires to dispatch
·jkt > 1. The value of trade flows from i to j is given by Xijt © mipijtCijt. Combine with price equation
(3.2) and eliminate firm measure to obtain a usual gravity equation:
Xijt =
C
◊≠1
◊
ijtq
k
pi
pk
YkC
◊≠1
◊
kjt
YiYj . (3.3)
The trade costs are calculated using the following expression: log ·ij = Î log dij , where dij denotes the
distance between regions i and j. Finally, the gravity equation (3.3) can be cast in matrix form where all
variables are in logarithms:
X = —01+ —1Ydestination + —2 ÂYorigin + —3Âd+ —4 Âw+ —5WX, (3.4)
whereW = [Sdiag (L)]¢ In, 1 is the vector of ones, diag (L)n◊n = diag (Li/L)i=1,..., n , all variables with a
tilde are equal to ÂX © (I≠W)X. They are measured as the deviation from the labour force (L) weighted
average. Yet, trade is not the only source of interdependence, and we turn to capital now.
4 As demonstrated by the current financial turmoil, the small open economies may face large liquidity constraints due to
global risk shocks. In empirical part we therefore employ di erent interest rates, capturing both accessability of capital and
its ‘representative’ price rt.
5 Note that E ((1≠ ut+1)wt+1) = (1≠ ut)Ewt+1 if ut+1 and wt+1 are independent. We assume that probability of un-
employment for a very small and open economy depends on foreign countries, therefore, our assumption is conditionally
valid.
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3.1.3 Foreign capital inflows
Now we assume that FDI can bring new inputs to an economy thereby promoting competition in domestic
input markets. We follow the framework of Razin and Sadka (2001). An increase in input varieties is
interpreted as the technology transfer. The production function of varieties is Ct = F
1
Kt
1
htÂLt22. Capital
is assumed to be a composite good consisting of N inputs (k1, k2, . . . , kN ) , Kt =
1qN
j=1 k
Í
j,t
21/Í
, where
0 < Í < 1. Productivity gains arise due to change in the rate of return, which derives via the use of foreign
savings to augment the domestic capital stock, technology transfer through increased variety of capital
inputs, and the increase in competition in the input market.
Let the available labour stock of the region j be used only for the production of intermediate and denote
it by L˜jt = (1≠ ujt) (1≠ ﬁ1jt)Ljt. The number of employees is equal to the ‘endowment’ of the working-age
population Lj0, which is assumed to stay constant across each period minus the migrants outflow EMt,
plus the return migrants IMt,
(1≠ ﬁ1jt)Ljt = Lj0 + net migrationt. (3.5)
The net migration (IMt≠EMt) is assumed to depend on future prospects of wage di erences, following the
empirical finding that transition economies react to slumps heavily and suddenly, while wages in advanced
economies change sluggishly, especially downwards. Hence, any crisis makes migration more attractive.
If we keep inputs constant, then output will be increasing in the number of varieties. Hence, trade in
intermediate goods generates a form of international increasing returns, see also Chakraborty (2003).
All producers will serve a di erent variety due to fixed costs. Hence, production of representative kj
requires ak units of overhead capital, constituting the fixed cost: aktrt = Ft, where rt is the rental rate and
Ft is the fixed cost. From before, the marginal cost component is aLt
1
hit
Ë
aie
—
it
È2
wt where the first term is
marginal labour requirement that is smaller for higher level of human capital, and the wage rate wt which
is positively related to the human capital. Finally, each producer will equate marginal costs to marginal
revenues which leads to price pKit = aLt
1
hit
Ë
aie
—
it
È2
wt/Í. FDI inflows imply that a firm located in country
j maximizes its profit, given by
q
k
!
pjk ≠ tpKj ·jk
"
Cjk ≠ FpKj , thereby yielding the price set by the firms:
pjk = ◊/ (◊ ≠ 1) ·jktpKj . The same argument of the zero profit yields the condition that operating surplus
must be of the same magnitude as fixed cost
q
k pjkCjk/◊ = FpKj , implying
q
k ·jkCjk = (◊ ≠ 1)F/t.
Finally, the region-wide resource constraint tells that with the present capital endowment, the lacking
capital is brought only from abroad. From the discussion on trade, we had mipijC¯ = Yi·ij , so that
mipiF
1
Kt
1
htÂLt22 = Yi . (3.6)
Hence, FDI is positively related to the need of capital, given the labour stock. In other words, decreasing
labour supply due to emigration requires more FDI to counteract labour movements. Implicitly, wages also
determine the need for FDI: the higher the wages, the less capital is needed to satisfy demand. However,
the more productive is a worker compared to the cost of education,6 the higher is the demand for capital
from the final goods producers. This explanation does not confront with that of D’Agosto et al. (2006)
which claim that FDI increases bilateral information and knowledge on employment, wages abroad, and
practices, technical and organizational procedures in foreign enterprises. Neither does it demur to Federici
and Giannetti (2008) which claim that migration flows reveal cultural characteristics and labour force
features that may stimulate inflows of capital to the emigrants’ homelands.
3.1.4 Linkages between FDI and trade
However, firms can also opt for pure trading instead of investing (FDI). Following Neary (2009) operating
profits of serving the parent-country market may be expressed as a function of marginal factor costs and
6 In our framework, investment in education reduces consumption of final goods in the current period, and therefore has a
negative impact on the demand for capital. However, if education boosts productivity significantly in the next period, demand
for both final and capital goods may increase. In turn, more people are hired, especially if there is a shortage of FDI.
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market access costs. If the multinational remains a domestic firm and supplies home market from its parent
facitilies, where wıt is the local wage rate, its profits will equal ﬁıt
!
pıK (wıt ) , ·
"
.7 Alternatively, it can invest
in the host country, exporting all its output back to the source country and incure a trade cost of ·ıt . The
firm incurs a plant-specific fixed cost fi, and earns operating profits of ﬁıt
!
pK (wt) + ·ıt , ·
"
, where wt is
the host-country wage. Then, the relative profitability of FDI can be captured by the di erence in profits.
Presumably, Baltics possess smaller trade cost than outsiders, which introduces an additional gain from
serving the partner-country market, namely the export-platform gain.
Indeed, often overlooked reason for engaging in FDI is preparation for penetrating a large market (Rus-
sia), by exploiting small bu er-countries which are more West-oriented, predictable and associated with the
target through various linkages. These include widespread knowledge of Russian language, old links between
companies and interactions at both commercial and personal levels inherited from the Soviet times. Hence,
multinationals may first settle in a less risky environment to explore possibilities of the Russian market,
thus making the Baltics their export platforms.
Note that unlike Head and Mayer (2004), which consider the potential market location, we introduce a
new dimension into the analysis. Russia is of su cient size for engaging in FDI (which has a good growth
potential, too), but the major obstacle is uncertainty, mainly due to political situation. Unlike Robb and
Vettas (2003), which assume that demand uncertainty and irreversibility of FDI give rise to both exports
and investment, our argument is thatthe major source of uncertainty is rooted in local knowledge of business
practices and links with the ‘right’ authorities in Russia. Hence, the parameter of new capital varieties n is
given by
n = f
!
·, gRussiat≠4 , fi
"
. (3.7)
which decreases the price of capital and increases its productivity. The capital varieties are related to both
trade costs and the lagged growth of Russian market, the latter reflecting the time for making a decision.
This lays down the foundations for the empirical enquiry.
4 Empirical Results
All region economies must be considered together, as economic integration requires multiple correlations
between the region’s constituents. In the empirical exercise, we employed the following variables for the
whole Baltic region: MIG which denotes a flow of migrants, w is the real log wage, Y·is the real log
GDP, either destination or origin, r is the interest rate vector, HC and SoE stand for human capital and
spending on education, d is a measure of distances between capital cities (in km), WX is the weighted
trade flows where W = [Sdiag (L)]¢ In, ¢ denotes the Kronecker product, S is the n ◊ n matrix of ones,
diag (L)n◊n = diag (Li/L)i=1,..., n , where L is the labour force. Then, gRussiat≠4 is growth rate of the real
Russian GDP with 4 quarters lag. Finally, we include the set of indicator variables
q
Cs where Cs =1
if s = i, j for the flow between i and j, and zero otherwise. We account for fixed-e ect terms in all
flow equations to control for the general-equilibrium e ects (“multilateral resistance” terms)8 and capture
heterogeneity as suggested by Feenstra (2004) (also see Anderson and Yotov (2012) which document that
fixed e ects are well in line with structural gravity forces). Our setting allows for spatial correlation in the
trade equation which captures interdependence and “hubness” e ect (directing export activities towards
“hub” countries), see Morales et al. (2011).
The previous discussion points to the estimating system. Therefore, we are dealing with the following
relations:
MIG =”01+ ”1 Âw+ ”2Ydestination + ”3r+ ”4HˆC+ ”5 ˆSoE+qµMIGs Cs + uMIG
X = —01+ —1Ydestination + —2 ÂYorigin + —3Âd+ —4 Âw+ —5WX+qµXs Cs + uX
FDI = Ÿ01+ Ÿ1ÎÂd+ Ÿ2gRussiat≠4 + Ÿ4 Âw+ Ÿ5MIGt≠4 + Ÿ6Xt≠4 +qµFDIs Cs + uFDI (4.1)
7 Fixed costs are independent of how the firm serves the foreign market, so we follow Neary (2009) and omit them.
8 The area of estimating gravity is flourishing: early contributions by Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985) missed the
‘multilateral resistances’ which create di erences in trade patterns and shape the entire trade network, see Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003). Bergstrand et al. (2008) try to account for the theory-implied intercept value; Helpman et al. (2008) develop
a gravity model that predicts positive as well as zero trade flows; Egger et al. (2011) develop a structural model with path
dependence implied by the fixed costs; Yotov and Olivero (2012) allow for explicit dynamics in a gravity setting.
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where wage equation is estimated to extract relevant information and foreign variation, human capital, and
education spending, so that it could be treated as weakly exogenous. The same applies to origin GDP.
Rationalisation of the first equation stems from equation (3.5) combined with migration probability,
unemployment, interest rate, stock of human capital and expenses on education enter the equation in levels.
Recall that migration probability depends on wages whereas unemployment on trading partners’ income,
both variables measured in a deviation form. Trade flows are measured as have been shown in (3.3) and
(3.4). Finally, FDI equation is written from (3.6) using the described capital aggregation. Trade costs
enter as they have been defined in the trade equation, changes in Russian economic performance as in (3.7),
dummies control for system-wide e ects and the cost of entering the market (gains from FDI). Wages enter
the equation because of the FDI gain argument. Trade flows capture the amount of imported goods that
can be used for capital formation, and may be one of the channels to introduce capital varieties as in the
aggregate capital Kt. Finally, capital production in our model requires labour which is assumed to vary
because of net migration; the local wage depends on human capital stock and investment in education, see
the price equations with FDI and constraint in (3.6).
4.1 Data Analysis
We have chosen three Baltic States and their most influential neighbours in terms of trade, migration and
FDI. Hence, we consider Scandinavian nations (Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark), Germany and the
UK, and Russia. They account for a considerable share of economic activities in the Baltics: usually over
50% of their total linkages with the world. As such, we can reasonably expect that our analysis reflects the
most significant relations with the foreign countries. Our data encompass a period from 1992Q1 to 2009Q2,
or 70 quarters.9 More details on data are provided in SM.
We started with the unit-root testing, employing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test known for its
good power characteristics compared to other unit roots tests. All variables are stationary with migration
causing doubts: it demonstrates some outbursts (EU enlargement) but has no clear trend. We report test
results without a trend, unless it is clear that a variable is trending (e.g. GDP). This does not, however,
a ect conclusions because trend did not change the outcome. Therefore, all variables as they appear in the
system may be treated as stationary; the null of a unit root has been rejected.
9 The choice of time dimension is dictated by two reasons: first, we wanted to comply with data availability in the early
sections on data facts; second, we aimed to avoid most recent quarters which carry a danger of structural breaks and substantial
amount of noise. We are to establish a story about cooperation rather than adjustment or synchronisation at a business cycle
(which we consider as an interesting extension).
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Tab. 4.1: Unit root tests for the variables in levels
Variable Test Statistic Critical Value Variable Test Statistic Critical Value
logRGDP
DF=-5.0809
ADF(1)=-5.1754
ADF(2)=-5.3422
ADF(3)=-5.4306
ADF(4) = ≠4.4027
-3.4179 logTrade
DF=-4.1002
ADF(1) = ≠4.0641
ADF(2) = ≠4.1234
ADF(3) = ≠4.2002
ADF(4) = ≠3.5065
-2.8657
r
DF=-9.9424
ADF(1)=-10.5226
ADF(2) = ≠11.9337
ADF(3) = ≠8.5933
ADF(4) = ≠8.6337
-2.8657 WX
DF = 3.8150
ADF(1)=-3.5572
ADF(2) = ≠3.6050
ADF(3) = ≠3.6976
ADF(4) = ≠3.7066
-2.8657
logHumCap
DF = ≠5.7245
ADF(1)=-5.8386
ADF(2) = ≠5.9603
ADF(3) = ≠6.0903
ADF(4) = ≠6.1441
-3.4179 logFDI
DF=-13.2361
ADF(1) = ≠8.9244
ADF(2) = ≠6.7722
ADF(3) = ≠5.7589
ADF(4) = ≠5.4524
-2.8657
logMIG
DF = 3.1883
ADF(1) = ≠3.2126
ADF(2) = ≠3.2376
ADF(3)=-3.2632
ADF(4)=3.3030
-2.8657 Russian growth
DF=-22.3056
ADF(1) = ≠23.6832
ADF(2) = ≠15.0440
ADF(3) = ≠10.3806
ADF(4) = ≠10.6078
-2.8657
logSoE
DF = ≠9.2347
ADF(1)=-9.7823
ADF(2)=-10.4424
ADF(3) = 11.2595
ADF(4) = ≠7.9948
-2.8657
Critical values are 95% for the ADF
Since there was no nonstationarity detected, we can turn to the estimation framework that suits our
type of data and model.
4.2 Empirical Evidences
We continue with the technique known as seeemingly unrelated regresssion equations (SURE), originally
analysed by Zellner (1962). We can treat the system of equations as the restricted multivariate VAR.
Moreover, this method allows us to account for direct and indirect e ects between FDI, migration and
international trade.10 The latter relationship comes through correlation in errors accross equations. The
direct e ect is incorporated in equations with the lagged variables of interest. Further, we partially control
for spatial interdependence and account for flows to other countries insofar as they relate to the Baltics. This
reveals how Baltic nations a ect each other while dealing with the same partners.11 Results are presented
in Table 4.2.
To reassure our choice of SURE, we calculated the Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistics to test whether a
non-diagonal error covariance matrix is characteristic to the model. For brevity, we consider Lithuania’s
statistic only. The comparison between system log-likelihood to the log-likelihood values for each equation
leads to LR=222.2 which is asymptotically distributed Chi-Square with 3 df. The 95 per cent critical value
is ‰2 (3) = 7.81. We strongly reject the hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the three equations
is diagonal, which supports the use of SURE. The same conclusion manifests for Latvian and Estonian
systems.
4.2.1 Endogeneity issues
From the system of equations, we can foresee a problem that wage is not unconditionally exogenous variable.
Given weak exogeneity, however, implies that estimating conditional distribution parameters is no less
e cient than estimation of the full set of parameters of the joint distribution (Greene, 2003). Since we are
dealing with the theory implied relations, it is obvious that the wage is influenced by the agents’s decisions,
and decisions may be influenced by the wage level (or its di erence between home and foreign levels). The
solution of endogeneity involves the logics of Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS), proposed by Theil (1953).
10 It also allows for heteroskedasticity in the generalized SURE, see Bartels and Feibig (1992).
11 For estimation and technical details refer to Pesaran and Pesaran (2009) whose software Microfit we used for the analysis.
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Tab. 4.3: Regression results for Latvia
Equation Human capital (HC), Spending on education (SoE), Real wage , R¯
2 = .38
R¯2 = .42 R¯2 = .37 R¯2 = .38
r -.007 (.001)*** .37E-3 (.9E-4)*** -
rt≠4 - .35E-3 (.9E-4)*** -
dummyMIG -.271 (.08)*** .009 (.005) -
logwdestination .29 (.016)*** .013 (.001)*** -
logwdestination, t≠4 -.1 (.016)*** -.02 (.001)*** -
Fitted HC - - .26 (.01)***
Fitted SoE - - -1.5 (.25)***
log Ydestination - - .03 (.0065)***
log Ydestination, t≠4 - - -.02 (.0065)***
Note: Number of observations: 770, used in regression: 766 (due to the lagged variables). Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, ***
denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All specifications include a constant term.
For each Baltic State we estimate equation on human capital which, according to theory, is dependent
upon spending on education, interest rates, migration costs and wages abroad. Spending on education may
also depend on the quality of human capital, as better educated people tend to invest more in education,
especially where future welfare of their children is concerned. As an illustration, refer to Table 4.3.
Since we used lagged exogenous variables, autocorrelated error terms may be suspected. Assuming that
disturbances follow a stationary autoregressive process with stochastic initial values, a specification with
AR errors have been conducted. This procedure is warranted since we do not employ any lagged dependent
variables. However, the log-likelihood ratio statistics reveals that the null which postulates AR(1) against
standard OLS has been strongly rejected (‰2 (1) = 1266 and ‰2 (1) = 734 for human capital and spending,
respectively. Human capital equation, however, favoured AR(2) against AR(1), with ‰2 (1) = 1.18. This
was not a case for spending equation where we rejected AR(2) in favour of AR(1) with ‰2 (1) = 8.4 To learn
if there is indeed AR(2) error process in the equation of human capital, we performed Cochrane-Orcutt test
with the specified lags of AR process, and there were no signals of significant autoregressive behaviour with
AR(2) errors (the t≠ratio was ≠.63). Therefore, we opted for the OLS specification. Then, the fitted values
have been used to estimate the wage equation, see Table 4.3.
Another source of endogeneity is the deviation of Baltic countries’ GDPs from the weighted average of
partner countries’ GDPs, ÂYorigin. Its first term, namely domestic GDP, is endogenous because it depends
on FDI and trade (these components are used in calculating GDP), although trade is also claimed to depend
on GDP. Hence, we again employ the same reasoning and regress local GDPs on all exogenous variables,
extract exogenous variation, and use fitted values to construct ÂYorigin.
4.3 Interpretation
Estimates after adjustments for endogeneity are reasonably precise as depicted in Table 4.2. As expected,
adjusted wages negatively a ect migration whereas higher earning potential abroad attracts more Baltic
people. Human capital tends to be positively related to migration flows whereas spending on education is
consistently negative and significant. As theory hints, human capital can only be a deterrent of migration
if wages react strongly enough to it. Also, education spending reduces current consumption and requires
larger future gains, financial in particular. Since receiving countries are human capital abundant, an average
migrant may be relatively low skilled (high wage di erential rationalises this, see SM). Then lower investment
is related to more labour outflows. As such, inequality in the Baltics compared to Sweden or the UK may
explain why it is particularly “profitable” for low-ability agents to migrate to these countries, which not
only have higher average wage, but are also characterised with more equal income distribution.
Interest rate, also being a measure of discount rate, increases education attainment costs and makes
current consumption more valuable. Its e ect on migration depends on skill/ability distribution abroad and
at home, and respective wages. Higher rate causes more migrant flows from Latvia and Lithuania whose
human capital works in the same direction. Hence, wage increases favour lower-skilled workers. For better
qualified employees, higher interest rate may actually reduce migration. This may be the case in Estonia,
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where human capital is not a significant determinant of migration. Trade positively reacts to higher income
of partner-countries, as well as origin income level. Intra-regional trade growth has a positive e ect on
smaller Baltic economies (as captured by WX). Wage terms are positive which may be rationalised by
changing demand structure: the smaller the di erence between wages, the higher the trade.
All Baltic States indeed trade very extensively with their Scandinavian neighbours, as these o er good
training ground before entering other Western markets. Meanwhile, FDI has been flowing to Latvia owing
to lower wages. This was not a case for Estonia and Lithuania, presumably because higher wages have
been associated with higher productivity that outweighed increased costs. Economic development of Russia
a ects Latvian FDI significantly and positively; we note that Latvia has the largest Russian diaspora among
the three countries. Moreover, more annual FDI is attracted when trade and migration increased in the
previous year year, as more capital is then needed to counteract labour movements. It echoes the results of
Javorcik et al. (2011) on FDI and migrants’ flows, especially those of higher education, and Coughlin and
Wall (2011) on the e ect of information networks and intensity of trade. This again reassures our unified
treatment of capital, labour and trade flows.
In contrast to gravity literature (see McCallum (1995) which introduced very large negative foreign
country e ects for cross-border trading) and despite common sense as regards transportation costs, distance
is a relatively unimportant variable in our findings. Distance does not appear on the list of statistically
significant variables, confirming our initial idea that proximity is not the most important factor, especially
within well defined regions.12 In part, distance-inspired trade costs are outweighed by higher demand and
presumably better prices in destination countries. More importantly, distance may proxy for deeper factors
such as historical, cultural and other qualitative links, e ects of which are analysed in the next section,
where we present case studies for all three Baltic States.
5 Institutional alliances and ‘training ground’ e ect
Since the fall of Berlin wall, and especially during the EU membership negotiations, Scandinavian support
for the re-emerging Baltic countries has been coming in several major forms. One was the support in
re-engineering post-soviet public health system, as illustrated by Estonian-Finnish example in early 2000s.
Mentoring the Baltic environmental activities, a never-ending political and commercial battlefield, was
another big help. One more common training scheme was in the fields of diplomacy and other foreign
representation, facts and figures of which suggest particularly close links between Scandinavian and Baltic
countries. Finally, it was the strong Scandinavian support for the Baltic education system that helped certain
domestic establishments emerge among the best-ranked in Europe, as evidenced by SSE Riga example.
5.1 FinEst bridge, or Twinning Project
Estonian-Finnish Twinning Project on Occupational Health in 2000 was designed specially to support Es-
tonian accession into the EU, and at the same time take a step towards better quality of work life and
competitiveness of the economy. In the course of 21 months between August 2000 and May 2002 the Finish
Institute of Occupational Health helped to prepare Estonian institutions for the requirements of various EU
directives, in particular the Directive 89/391 on improvements in the health and safety of workers, and the
Directives 75/117 and 76/207 on the equality of men and women in employment.
Sending Finnish senior health and safety specialists to work in Estonia was the first big help, and
largely the point of the whole Twinning Project. The project inputs, mainly in the form of training and
consultations, were marked with the hands-on attitude from the Finnish side. In addition to conducting
numerous surveys, analyses and case studies in Estonia, Finnish experts helped with the drafting of policy
documents, strategies, legislation, and development of action programmes. During the project local health
professionals were presented an opportunity to learn from Finnish experiences, and increased competence of
Estonian occupational health specialists and administrative personnel is said to be one of the most important
outcomes of the project.
12 Fuller understanding of the distance variable would require further research, as the finding has been robust to changes
in the weight matrix. So far, the distance e ect even starts becoming significant and positive when we do not control for
“multilateral resistance” terms.
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According to both Estonian and Finnish o cials, success of the Twinning Project depended on good
bilateral planning and well-functioning relationships between individuals and institutions during the im-
plementation stage. And the very decision to cooperate was largely a continuation of the well-established
collaboration between Finnish and Estonian experts over the past decade, and in memory of the pre-war
mutual exchange experiences. Thanks to cultural and mental proximity of the two countries, Finnish experts
could understand the social particularities within Estonia, which reportedly helped to create an atmosphere
of trust and respect.13
At the time, the Twinning Project was a relatively new instrument for supporting the accession of
applicant countries into the EU, and it proved to be a very feasible and e ective approach. Already in the
initial stages in the late 1990s, the Twinning Project focused on the sustainability angle of the development,
aiming to avoid the unfair redistribution of public funds by transferring them to a numerous newly created
EU-related local organisations that duplicate each other, as it often happens in Member States. Finland,
which chose to allocate only limited administrative resources for dealing with the EU issues during her own
accession process, transferred the same experiences to Estonia.
A great deal was achieved by Estonia in less than two years, and in the areas that required both settle
and strong government steering and support. The country managed to achieve the EU standards with a
relatively low number of civil servants, without creating the unnecessary bureaucracy apparatus, and also
exceeding most of the EU member states in terms of time taken to prepare for the membership. With
Finnish help, Estonia took all the EU-required steps in a much shorter timeframe than what was available
to countries like Austria or Sweden.
5.2 Swedish mentoring model: case of SSE Riga
Stockholm School of Economics in Riga (SSE Riga) was established in 1993, soon after the three Baltic
States regained independence after 50 years of Soviet rule. This joint project between a Swedish institution
of higher education and the Latvian Government is one of the most interesting and representative examples
of sustainable mentorship in the Baltic Sea Region.
The establishment of SSE Riga was to a large extent one man’s vision. Sta an Burenstam Linder (1930-
2000), former Swedish Member of Parliament and Minister of Trade, pushed the concept of a small Swedish
school in Latvia that would give intensive training to a new generation of Baltic managers with English as
the language of instruction. The school was also designed to produce state-of-the-art research of relevance
to the Baltic countries and foster community debate in its fields of competence: in other words, initiate
fundamental changes in the public governance. Generous financial support from the three leading Swedish
banks active in the Baltic countries – Nordea, SEB and Swedbank – has played a pivotal role in ensuring a
solid basis for the development of SSE Riga. The Swedish Government also supported SSE Riga providing
a number of scholarships.
The results of the Swedish mentoring model are already evident. Since the first class was admitted to
SSE Riga in 1994, the school prepared more than 1,500 young professionals. Since 2007, SSE Riga has
appeared in the Financial Times Ranking14 of European Business Schools, as a top business school in the
Baltics and 19th out of 75 in Europe.15
A more localised example of mentoring is the creation of SSE Riga Mentor Club, which provides support
to infant companies with strong growth potential and ambition to pursue their business development. The
mentors are alumni members of the SSE Riga who give companies practical management and business
advice, feedback on business development scenarios, consultations and contacts. In a way, such model
creates mentorship within mentorship, taking the whole ‘mentor country’ concept further, down to an
individual company level, and possibly even down to individual entrepreneurs.
13 According to the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health (2002).
14 The Financial Times conducts annual rankings of business schools, universities and other institutions that o er di erent
forms of business education, executive training and functional training throughout Europe and the rest of the world. These
schools and programs are evaluated using a number of criteria, including comprehensive surveys of the curriculum, training
sta , as well as quantitative information provided by the business schools themselves. The rankings contain information on
such topics as career progress and salary percentage increase, as well as teaching methodology, faculty qualifications and
international exposure.
15 The School is ranked together with its ‘mother’, the Stockholm School of Economics (SSE).
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In 2010, ownership of SSE Riga was fully transferred to Latvia, as it was originally intended since the
establishment in 1993. The school was formally destined to eventually have a Latvian owner, and the
ceremonial transfer of SSE Riga shares to a Latvian organisation acts as a confirmation that the country is
now ready to continue with the project on its own.
5.3 Evidence of Scandinavian political mentoring in Lithuania
Country-to-country mentoring principles are also visible in facts and figures from the region’s diplomacy
practice and other foreign representation. All three Baltic States put a lot of e ort re-creating diplomatic
links and foreign relationships with the world, after independence from the Soviet Russia was regained.
While total number of in-and-out formal visits depends on many factors and is usually related to size,
location and relative importance of the host country, an interesting aspect to study is the response ratio for
the Baltic diplomacy e orts in 1991-2011. For the purpose of this paper we use Lithuania and its foreign
relationships as a benchmark for the Baltic States.
According to the information published by the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign A airs, the most intensive
foreign representation during the post-soviet era occurred between Lithuania and neighbouring Poland and
Latvia. Other diplomatically important countries included mostly large-scale European economies such as
the UK, France, Germany, Sweden and Spain. Since 1999, total number of visits16 to and from France was
28. Formal meetings with Spanish politicians came to 29; whereas visits to and from the UK amounted
to 25. Diplomatic relationship between Lithuania and most of the ‘old’ EU countries averaged 2.2 o cial
visits per year in 1999-2011.
Tab. 5.1: Number of o cial visits to and from Lithuania, 1999-2011
From Lithuania To Lithuania Visits per year Response ratio
Sweden 15 27 6.0 180%
Denmark 13 10 2.9 77%
Finland 17 17 3.8 100%
Norway 8 11 1.7 138%
UK 17 8 1.9 47%
Spain 25 4 2.2 16%
France 21 7 2.3 33%
* Figure in the "visits per year" column does not always directly correspond with the given number of visits between certain countries,
as the period under review varies depending on the format in which the original data was presented by the Lithuanian Ministry of
Foreign A airs. Period of 1999-2011 was the most common, but in some cases the time frame was in fact 2004-2011. It is taken into
account when presenting calculations and findings, but for the simplicity of the text we did not specity the exact review period for
each individual country.
** Response ratio is calculated taking the number of visits from Lithuania to other countries, and counting what percentage of those
was covered by corresponding visits to Lithuania.
Source: Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign A airs, authors’ calculations.
Figures from within the Baltic Sea region were significantly higher. Period of 2003-2011 saw 23 o cial
meetings with Danish representatives, 34 with politicians from Finland and 42 formal occasions between
Lithuania and Sweden, in addition to numerous meetings with Latvian o cials. Average number of meetings
between Lithuanian and Danish, Finnish and Swedish authorities reached 4.1 per year, almost twice the
average recorded with other ‘old’ Europe countries.
Given the assumptions of the Nordic-Baltic mentoring model, a more interesting aspect than total
foreign representation scope is the direction of that representation. In a typical year, Lithuania’s foreign
relationship with countries like Spain, Germany, France and the UK was characterised by a lot of diplomatic
e orts from the Lithuanian side, resulting in a rather negligible response. In 1999-2011 Lithuania made 17
formal visits to the UK, but received only eight visits back. Similarly, Lithuanian o cials went to France
21 times and received seven French visits. Spain only made four o cial trips to Lithuania since 1999, even
though Lithuanian politicians did six times that and visited the country 25 times. Statistically, Lithuania’s
16 Visits that are formally recognised by the Ministry as the most important foreign representation cases.
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relationship with and the ‘old’ Europe had a merely 32% diplomatic response ratio in 1999-2011, meaning
that only one out of three foreign visits was covered by corresponding visits to Lithuania.
Within the Baltic Sea region the picture is largely, if not entirely reversed. Since 2003, Lithuania’s
13 visits to Denmark were answered with 10 visits from Denmark to Lithuania, giving the response ratio
of 77%. Relationship with Finland was marked with 17 visits each way; a 100% response ratio. Swedish
o cials visited Lithuania 27 times since 2004, almost double the number of Lithuanian visits to Sweden
during the same time frame, giving the diplomacy response ratio of 180%, and confirming its role as a
mentor country for the Baltics.
6 Quo Vadis?
Analysis of the FDI flows, trade patterns and other quantifiable aspects within the Baltic Sea region hints
to the existence of strong qualitative links within the area. Features like shared historic and cultural back-
ground, common political approach and even linguistics appear to have impacted intra-regional development
to great extent, confirming the assumption that geographic proximity is although definitely important, but
not the single determinant of international integration.
Empirical evidence confirms the strength of the Baltic-Scandinavian integration model, suggesting ever
higher interdependence and intensive flows of people, goods and services, and capital. This was recently
recognised by the European Commission itself, which identified the Baltic Sea region as a model for regional
economic development in Europe.
“We are returning to an old tradition. EU States around the enclosed Baltic Sea are rediscovering their
common interests and forging at an unprecedented pace. As a peaceful, stable and economically booming
region, the Baltic Sea region is rapidly becoming an integral part of the new Europe.
“In these circumstances, the area could be a model of regional co-operation where new ideas and ap-
proaches can be tested and developed over time as best practice examples,” says the 2009 Baltic Sea Region
Programme.
The future is promising too. Although during the 2009 recession the Baltic Sea region recorded GDP
declines significantly deeper than those in the rest of the EU, all countries in the region witnessed stronger
than EU upturn already in 2010-2011. To this date, much of the EU27 continues to struggle with insolvency
issues brought onto them by unsustainable borrowing practices and artificial stimulation of the economy. In
contrast, countries like Estonia, Sweden and Finland, supported by sound management of public finances,
are back on the growth track. And Prof Pakstas is today called ‘an unheard messenger’. 70 years later,
his innovative Nordic-Baltic integration ideas as expressed in the Baltoscandian Confederation are taking
place, and perhaps even beyond the initial design.
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Supplementary Material
A Migration Choice
Migration changes the result since the expected lifetime earnings become:
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where wıt > wt is the expected wage for uneducated workers abroad (showing the di erences in the minimum
wage), “2 captures the of the foreign labour market sensitivity to the human capital, which is assumed to
be higher compared to the domestic economy and ·M is the fixed costs related to migration.
Further, observe that nil investment translates into the same wage level across periods, wt+1 = wt (1 + “1—ht+1) =
wt with —ht+1 = 0. Combine (A.1) with the restriction and consider no migration, ﬁ1 = 0, this yields
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Under no migration, ﬁ1 = 0, the above equation transforms into
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Ë
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—
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wt > (1 + rt) e1t
as stated in the text.
The indi erent agent is the one for whom (3.1) holds with equality:
aˆ = (1+rt)e
1≠—
1t
h1t[ﬁ1“2wıt+(1≠ut+1)wt(1≠ﬁ1)“1] ≠
e≠—1t ﬁ1((wıt≠·M)≠(1≠ut+1)wt)
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Thus, the higher is the di erential between the foreign and domestic wages, the lower is the ability of the
critical agent, i.e. the one who is indi erent between investing in education and not. Whenever there
is a higher wage possibility, this generates higher attainment of population’s education. The higher is
the positive sensitivity of education to the wage, both at home (“1) and abroad (“2), the higher is the
denominator, and, hence, the lower ability is needed to engage in education. In case of no di erence
between the net wages (migration costs and unemployment risk included), the critical agent possesses the
ability ‚a = (1 + rt) e1≠—1t /h1t [ﬁ1“2wıt + (1≠ ut+1)wt(1≠ﬁ1)“1] . Then, the share of educated who remain in
the country is given by the share of abilities of educated agents divided by the abilities of all agents less
those who left:
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Due to the structural change in the economic system, the transition countries experience a lack of productive
capital but have abundant skilled labour force.
Having in mind empirical considerations, we are more interested in the probability of migration. Unfor-
tunately, the expression
ﬁ1 = (
a¯≠‚a)≠(a≠a)seducated
(a¯≠‚a)(1≠seducated) (A.5)
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cannot be applied directly because seducated depends on ﬁ1. However, even without explicitly expressing
the probability of migration,17 we know that its reduced form depends on a set of variables such as wages,
future rate of unemployment, cost of education, interest rate, level of existing human capital, and the cost
of migration.
The indi erent agent’s ability is given by
ﬁ1“2hit
Ë
aie¯—t
È
wıt + (1≠ ut+1)wt(1≠ﬁ1)“1hit
Ë
aie¯—t
È
=
(1 + rt) e¯t + ﬁ1·M ≠ ﬁ1wıt ≠ (1≠ ut+1)wt(1≠ﬁ1) + (1≠ ut+1)wt,
or
ai = ﬁ1e¯
≠—
t ([1≠ut+1]wt≠(wıt≠·M))+(1+rt)e¯1≠—t
hit[ﬁ1“2wıt+(1≠ut+1)wt(1≠ﬁ1)“1]
aˆ = (1+rt)e¯
1≠—
t
hit[ﬁ1“2wıt+(1≠ut+1)wt(1≠ﬁ1)“1] ≠
e¯≠—t ﬁ1((wıt≠·M)≠(1≠ut+1)wt)
hit[ﬁ1“2wıt+(1≠ut+1)(1≠ﬁ1)“1wt] .
The explicit probability of migration can be written as
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which, rearranging, yields
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B Trade Choice
The real net income for consumption in region i over real incomes for consumption of all regions is equal
to the ratio of the masses of firms which are the only consumption producers in the economy. Then, from
definition
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mipij
= XijC¯
Yi·ij
(B.1)
where mipij = Yi·ijC¯ because mi =
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piC¯
and pij = ·ijpi which is a mark-up pricing. Substituting for Cijt in
(B.1) yields:
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since the net earnings are the only source of income wiL˜i = Yi and similarly to the logics of marginal rate
of technical substitution and its equality to marginal rate of substitution in equilibrium, we can define the
ratios for regions i and k: pipk =
wi
wk.
. Then, taking logarithms yields
logXijt = ◊ log Yj + ◊ logLi + (1≠ ◊) log ·ij + (1≠ ◊) log Yi ≠ ◊ log
3q
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Further, we can express the gravity in an estimating form. Recall that the value of trade flows from i to j
is given by Xijt © mipijtCijt. Combine with price equation (3.2) to obtain a usual gravity equation:
Xijt © mi
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17 This expression is meaningful i 
!
a¯≠‚a" Ø (a≠ a) seducated ∆ seducated Æ !a¯≠‚a"(a≠a) ‚ !a¯≠‚a" ≠ (a≠ a) seducated Æ!
a¯≠‚a" (1≠ seducated) … a Æ ‚a. The first condition ensures that the lower limit of ﬁ1 is zero while the second states the
upper limit cannot exceed 1. These requirements are fulfilled if a person, with the lower ability than that of a critical agent’s,
has not invested in education, and the critical agent must possess at least the lowest ability in the society.
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where the measure of firms was eliminated observing that
q
kmkYi/pi =
q
kmiYk/pk. The following is
true because free entry and exit drive profits to zero and imply the break-even quantity. After several
simplifications and linearization around ◊ = 1, see Behrens et al. (2012) for details, one obtains:
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where Xik/Yk is the export from i to k share in total income of k, L ©
q
k Lk is the total population/labour
force.
C Data for Empirical Exercise
We employed eight sources to extract relevant data. Note that FDI flows could enter with a negative sign
indicating that at least one of the three components of FDI (equity capital, reinvested earnings or intra-
company loans) is negative and not o set by positive amounts of the remaining components. These are
instances of reverse investment or disinvestment. As to the price indeces, we used Consumer Price Index
(CPI). For consumers, a relevant bundle of goods is that which has been used to compute CPI. So, for wage
earners as consumers a relevant real wage is the nominal wage (after-tax) divided by the CPI. Also, instead
of population, we use labour force since it is available at the frequency of a quarter. Moreover, it better fits
into a whole theoretical motivation. Other relevant information concerning data, such as short descriptions
and sources that were used, are summarised below.
Variable Sources
Trade* IMF, International Finance StatisticsStatistics Estonia, Latvia Statistics and Statistics Lithuania
Gross Domestic Product, nominal level IMF, International Finance Statistics
divided by GDP deflator* Statistics Estonia, Latvia Statistics and Statistics Lithuania
Labour force and employment (in thousands) IMF, International Finance StatisticsStatistics Estonia, Latvia Statistics and Statistics Lithuania
Wages for Baltic states expressed Statistics Estonia, Latvia Statistics and Statistics Lithuaniain dollars, divided by HICP
Wages for the rest taken from IMF, International Finance StatisticsCompensation for employees (BoP)
Human capital measured as a share Statistics Estonia, Latvia Statistics and Statistics Lithuaniaof labour force with higher education
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices IMF, International Finance Statistics
Spending on education measured Statistics Estonia, Latvia Statistics and Statistics Lithuaniaa share of public expenditure in GDP)
Migration
OECD International Migration
Statistics Estonia, Latvia Statistics
Statistics Lithuania, Eurostat, LaborSta
Distance (between capital cities, km) Google Facility
GDP Deflator (base year 2005) IMF, International Finance Statistics
Money market rate IMF, International Finance Statistics
(*) - all variables expressed in money units are measured Title and ownership of the data
in dollars, thousands. Frequency of all data is a quarter remain with the respective source
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